Suchergebnisse

P. 1: Hearing before the Task Force on Selected Defense Procurement Matters of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 98. Congress, 2nd Session, September 13, 1984. - 1985. - (S. HRG. 98-1256) (41-709 0); P. 2: Hearing before the Task Force on Selected Defense Procurement Matters of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 98. Congress, 2nd Session, September 20, 1984. - 1985. - (S. HRG. 98-1256) (41-142 0); P. 3: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Defense Acquisition Policy of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 99. Congress, 1st Session, January 30, 1985. - 1985.- III,38 S. - (S. HRG. 99-112) (46-665 0); P. 4: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Defense Acquisition Policy of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 99. Congress, 1st Session, February 20, 1985. - 1985. - III,38 S. - (S. HRG. 99-112) (47-202 0)

Is it possible to generate more efficient outcomes with respect to public procurement in general and defense acquisition in particular? Or are cost overruns inevitable when it comes to major engineering projects, like the development of modern weaponry? In this article, we draw on a unique data set of nearly 50 French armaments contracts in order to examine how one government has reformed its defense acquisition process over the past twenty years. Beginning in the early 1990s, France embarked on a series of policy reforms that enabled the state to contain skyrocketing weapons costs. We emphasize three, inter-related aspects of the defense acquisition environment in France that favored cost containment: first, hard budget constraints; second, the great technical capacity that the French government brought to bear on the weapons acquisition process, coupled with its iterative relationship with a small number of suppliers; and third, the use of contracting techniques that empowered project managers.

AbstractRisks that emerge during the implementation and enforcement stages of defense procurement help explain procurement outcomes. Adverse events have impacts on the timing, cost and quality of goods supplied. The procurement process is analyzed on the basis of an original dataset covering 48 defense procurement contracts signed by the French Ministry of Defense with 18 European contractors. Contractual problems create the most adverse events in this sector, while technological risk is the second most significant risk. Although opportunism takes various forms, it is found only rarely in these defense contracts.

This paper descrives some of the insights that the economic theory of incentives can contribute to defense procurment policy analysis. It descrives the underlying incentive problems that shape the defense procurement problem, the nature of current institutions and how they affect actors' behavior, and possible directions for improving the procurement process suggested by viewing it as a solution to a complex set of incentive problems. Incentive problems between government and defense firms and incentive problems within government are both considered.